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Abstract 
 
A number of commentators have recently identified a 'uniquely Scottish mode of 
thought in economics', or a particular 'Scottish political economy tradition'.  In this 
paper the concept of tradition, defined as those features common to practitioners over 
a relatively long period, is investigated in relation to 'school', 'paradigm' and 'research 
programme'.  An application of the concept to the Scottish Enlightenment period 
suggests that its use is in line with the philosophical approach of Adam Smith, and 
shows that the concept allows account to be taken of external institutional/historical 
influences in interpreting the history of economics. 
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1.  Introduction  
 Political economy in its modern form can be identified as arising from a variety of 
traditions which can be classified in terms of nationally-based intellectual traditions. There 
are of course important elements in common among these traditions, and important cross-
fertilisations throughout their history. Nevertheless, these traditions retain sufficient national 
characteristics to warrant their investigation on a national basis. It is the purpose here to 
consider the Scottish tradition in political economy. This is of interest in its own right, but 
also in terms of the influence which the Scottish tradition had on the future development of 
political economy, and economics, on an international scale. 
 In recent years there has been reference to the existence of a Scottish tradition 
of political economy2. Macfie detects a distinct attitude and method which characterised the 
writings of Scottish economists, who were defined as such on the basis of their birthplace or 
cultural milieu. Dow develops this idea further by placing most of those writers listed by 
Macfie within the context of the Scottish Enlightenment, and identifying methodological 
principles common to their works. Mair has collected essays on the work of several key 
figures in the history of political economy, together with the previous two papers, with the 
purpose of reiterating the case of a "uniquely Scottish mode of thought in economics" 3, and 
its influence on current economic discourse. Campbell, in reviewing a number of monographs 
on Scottish economic history, sees "the historical factor" as "firmly embedded in the Scottish 
tradition of economic thought"4. 
Taken as a whole, these contributions raise interesting questions regarding the nature 
of any Scottish tradition, together with the prior issue of what actually constitutes a tradition. 
Satisfactory answers to these questions should make it possible to distinguish between 
political economists operating within the Scottish tradition, and those outside it. Macfie 
attempts to trace a chronology in the development of 'Scottish' economic thought from 
Francis Hutcheson to John Stuart Mill.  For him, the writers featured shared a "philosophical" 
or "sociological" approach, as opposed to a "scientific" or "analytical" method.  Their work, 
therefore, is not linked in terms of theoretical agreement as much as by an approach to the 
subject. Dow5 attempts to specify characteristic features of a Scottish tradition, and, in so 
doing, to construct a paradigm (in the Kuhnian sense) which would enable the inclusion, or 
otherwise, of scholars vis-à-vis the specific discourse community being postulated. Mair 
picks up the use of 'tradition' from Macfie and Dow and Campbell uses it himself, but none of 
them defines the term. 
This paper is a starting point in a wider project which will form a view of the history 
of economics in Scotland using the idea of a distinctive Scottish tradition; we wish to define 
that tradition and to assess the extent of its continuity and continuing influence 6.  The aim 
here is to lay the groundwork for this project by investigating the concept of 'tradition'—as 
opposed to 'school', 'paradigm', or 'research programme', for example.  This will provide a 
basis for assessing those writings which characterised the emergent study of political 
economy in Scotland.   
The work of Adam Smith is considered here as exemplary of the discourse of the 
Enlightenment period. What became the discipline of political economy was originally 
founded upon principles very different from those which now govern what has become 
'economics', a difference related to the contrasting conceptions of human nature and 
knowledge characteristic of the Scottish philosophers and the English utilitarians.  It may be 
said that Smith was not a 'Classical' economist.  Rather, it was as an unintended consequence 
that the Wealth of Nations was to inspire a separate field of inquiry which has evolved 
outwith the bounds of moral philosophy.  Such an outcome may well have disturbed Smith 
and his contemporaries, whose aim was to understand more thoroughly the connections and 
interactions between the several institutions which, at any time and in any place, constitute 
human society. 
In the next section we attempt to clarify the sense in which we use word 'tradition'.  
This is followed by a discussion of the development of ideas in twentieth—century 
philosophy of science on the concept of tradition.  Finally we consider the Scottish 
enlightenment, and in particular Smith, in terms of tradition, and indeed as contributing to our 
understanding of the concept itself. 
 
 
2.  Terminology 
We begin by considering various terms which may be used to describe and delineate 
scientific discourse communities. The choice of terminology affects the methodology of 
research into the history of thought, which, like all history, is the contemporary interpretation 
of past processes and events. This makes the exercise vulnerable to an inappropriate 
superimposition of present day issues and approaches onto past discourse 7. Inevitably we 
cannot free ourselves from the constraints imposed by the knowledge that we possess. Those 
who see science as progressing towards a more accurate approximation of truth may assume 
that our knowledge is superior to that of those we are studying. On the other hand, we may 
regard alternative theories as just those—alternatives, each adhering to its own set of norms 
which cannot provide suitable criteria for the assessment of others, since any conclusion 
necessarily points to the superiority of the host paradigm.  However, for neither position is it 
a satisfactory practice to invoke the work of an Adam Smith to help to legitimate present-day 
theory and policy, without taking account of the historical circumstances to which he referred, 
and the social and institutional environment which both formed him and played host to his 
intellectual endeavour. 
We recognise that persuasion must be an important element of the case presented 
here, as of science in general.  In order that a sufficiently persuasive interpretation of the 
history of political economy discourse in Scotland is realised, it is first necessary to establish 
the meaning of the terms chosen to signify particular phenomena.  Specifically, the term 
'tradition' has been selected in preference to school, paradigm or research programme. In what 
follows we develop a rationale for that choice. First a definition of tradition is established, 
which forms the basis for a comparative appraisal of the other terms. In subsequent sections 
Adam Smith's philosophy of science is examined as further underpinning our concept of 
tradition, and, in contrast, we offer a discussion of Karl Popper's treatment of tradition.  
The word 'tradition' conveys an idea of continuity, if not permanence. It is a static, as 
opposed to dynamic, entity. According to the Collins English Dictionary (1979 edition), a 
tradition is 
·   the handing down from generation to generation of the same customs, 
beliefs, etc., esp. by word of mouth; 
· the body of customs, thought, practices, etc., belonging to a particular 
country, people, family, or institution over a relatively long period; 
· a specific custom or practice of long standing. 
Traditions continue from generation to generation, but their length of life is 
indeterminate. Thus a tradition can be identified, however approximately, as beginning (and 
ending, if appropriate) at a particular time. Such identification is necessarily retrospective, 
although it may be asked "when does a custom or belief become a tradition?"  We would not 
wish to impose a strict time limit on what constitutes "a relatively long period". Such 
indeterminacy is unavoidable. It is preferable that historians of thought, or of anything else 
for that matter, are free to build their own case as to what might constitute a particular 
tradition over whatever time period, as long as the application of a concept of tradition does 
not contradict the definitions outlined above. Such a position is consistent with the argument, 
developed below, that persuasion is an important element in scientific endeavour. It also 
rejects Popper's implied view of tradition as a given entity, independent of historical context. 
The alternative terms available to this sort of analysis are 'school' and 'paradigm'.  
Neither serves the present purpose as well as 'tradition'. 
Among the many dictionary meanings which the term 'school' possesses, the 
following two are the most relevant: 
· a body of people or pupils adhering to a certain set of principles, 
doctrines, or methods. 
· a group of artists, writers, etc., linked by the same style, teachers, or 
aims: the Venetian school of painting. 
The use of 'school' to describe a particular group of scholars or artists connotes a 
specific time period, which is shorter than that suggested by 'tradition'.  We may refer to a 
particular school of writers as belonging to a tradition of inquiry, operating within the 
boundaries set by that tradition.  For example, we might refer to a tradition of realism within 
philosophy. Within that tradition there are various schools of thought, such as that of Gottlob 
Frege, which possess various differing features but which adhere to essential realist precepts 
8. In such cases schools are subsets of the larger entities, traditions.  Understanding them in 
this way, we can trace the development and evolution of those factors which contribute to the 
establishment of a particular school of thought, relating it to a 'family' or genealogy of works, 
which are linked by essential features which define the nature of the tradition to which they 
belong.   
It is also possible that schools lie outside a recognised tradition. This relates to the 
problem of deciding how long certain phenomena must persist before they constitute a 
tradition. We might say that a school, often connoting a shorter time period than tradition, is a 
group of practitioners adhering to a certain set of principles. A key characteristic of a school 
is its tighter focus upon not only core doctrines or beliefs, but also one or more dominant 
personalities. Therefore schools do not necessarily belong to traditions, although if they do 
then they may share features in common with other schools, and it is these aspects which 
constitute the tradition. Such a concept of school contradicts the argument that we are bound 
by tradition, and that the rejection of one merely places us in another 9.       
The existence of a Scottish historical school of inquiry has often been noted10.  What 
links the members of this school is their adherence to "a distinct theory of 
history...remarkable for its formality and for the clear and unequivocable link which was 
established between economic and social organisation"11.  Skinner explicitly links the 
existence of this school, in terms of time period and location, to Scotland in the eighteenth 
century.  Thereafter he is able to identify the members of the discourse community which 
governs the development of historical inquiry in Scotland.  
That school can be placed within the wider context of a Scottish tradition of 
philosophical inquiry.  It is in this philosophical tradition that the Scottish historical school 
began inquiry into what became the subject of political economy.  Earlier writers had already 
addressed similar issues12, and they did influence the direction of inquiry undertaken by the 
Scots. But in the same way that later scholars, who belonged to other traditions and were 
inspired by the Scots' work, incorporated certain features of it in the construction of quite 
different theoretical systems (e.g. Ricardo and Marx), so the Scottish philosophers criticised 
and incorporated aspects of their predecessors within the context of their own philosophical 
environment. Following the Enlightenment period, there remained in Scotland a particular 
structure of higher education, again the product of, inter alia, the intellectual climate, which 
incorporated the teaching of political economy within philosophy curricula. It was only 
towards the end of the last century that chairs of political economy were established in 
Glasgow and Edinburgh.  From the turn of the century developed a separation of the teaching 
of what was for a period labelled 'economic science' at both Universities from Moral 
Philosophy.  The process of professionalisation of 'economics', and its institutionalisation as a 
discipline within higher education in England, the USA and elsewhere from the latter part of 
the 19th century, ultimately generated a homogenisation of the subject into a 'technical' 
orthodoxy divorced from its philosophical roots.  That this process appears to have happened 
more slowly, and perhaps less completely13 in Scotland than in other parts of the Anglo—
American world may offer some evidence for the influence of a separate Scottish 'tradition'. 
From this it is clear that our concept of tradition, as enunciated so far, takes account of 
more than the content of theories. As Galbraith14 has remarked, ideas have no respect for 
national boundaries, and are disseminated across geographical borders with ever-increasing 
ease. But what constitutes an intellectual tradition must include the institutional environment 
in which discourse takes place. Tribe15 argues that 'tradition' involves 'not simply theoretical, 
practical and descriptive principles, but the role and organisation of teaching_the application 
of economic knowledge and the establishment of professional and academic associations.'   
For it is in the institutional environment that these dynamic entities—ideas—are set in 
relation to what has been discussed before and what has yet to come. 
Debates in the modern philosophy of science have had a profound influence on the 
way that economists have interpreted the development of their discipline16, as well as 
inspiring a keen interest in methodological issues17.Typically this has centred upon the 
applicability of Popperian falsification, Kuhnian paradigms, and Lakatosian research 
programmes.  But Popper himself is a major contributor to the development of the notion of 
tradition.  We consider the contribution of philosophers of science to the concept of tradition 
in the next section. 
3.  Tradition in Twentieth—Century Philosophy of Science 
Karl Popper, although he described himself as a "rationalist of sorts"18, was 
uncomfortable with the conventional rationalist treatment of tradition.  In striving to judge 
everything upon its own merits, independent of any tradition, the (what we might call) naïve 
rationalist in fact adheres, unconsciously, to a rationalist tradition 19. Popper argued that we 
may either treat the subject of tradition uncritically, which is the simple acceptance 
(conscious or not) of traditions, or critically, where we question traditions with a view to 
accepting, rejecting or compromising them20. 
A theory of tradition is, for Popper, necessarily a sociological theory21. The aim of 
social theory is to examine human action and explain its consequences, including those which 
are unintended.  This latter aspect is of particular interest as "it is one of the striking things 
about social life that nothing ever comes off exactly as intended"22. One way in which these 
unintended consequences affect human existence is in the formation of institutions and 
collectives.  In a similar way traditions are formed, and Popper wishes to explain how this 
phenomenon takes place, given that people rarely wish to start one, and will most likely fail 
to do so if they try. Also in need of explanation is the function of tradition in society.  Popper 
attempts to provide answers by means of analysing what he refers to as "the rational or 
scientific tradition"23. 
In an interesting discussion of the evolution from pre-scientific mythology to critical 
discourse in ancient Greece, Popper shares Smith's idea that the theory which replaced myth 
was in fact myth also24, and that, "in a certain sense, science is myth-making just as religion 
is"25.  In other words, it was only when the older set of explanations of natural phenomena 
ceased to be satisfactory that new explanations were formulated instead.  What truly 
differentiated the old explanations from the new was the establishment of a discourse 
community, in which postulates could be challenged, discussed, refined and replaced. On this 
basis knowledge evolved.  What distinguished science from the mere traditional handing 
down of mythological explanations was the adoption of critical analysis, which facilitated its 
development. 
Following a demonstration of the futility of inductivism, Popper argues that good 
science is that which attends to areas of current disagreement and debate, "_the problem 
situation of the day. This means that you pick up, and try to continue, a line of inquiry which 
has the whole background of the earlier development of science behind it; you fall in with the 
tradition of science"26.  This tradition does not tell us where to begin analysing the world, but 
it does enable us to advance upon the progress made by previous generations, which have 
established "a kind of theoretical framework - not perhaps a very good one, but one which 
works more or less; it serves us as a kind of network, as a system of co-ordinates to which we 
can refer the various complexities of this world"27.  This is the scientific tradition—not so 
much the accumulation of knowledge but the criticism of it.  And like all traditions, it uses its 
own language with which to communicate its own knowledge28. 
Thus tradition is a fundamental component of human existence.  The supercession of  
a religious mythology in ancient Greece was not the overthrow of tradition per se.  Rather, it 
was the replacement of one tradition with another.  Just as institutions provide a means of 
guidance concerning human action and expectation in society, so traditions act as providers of 
order and predictability.  "Just as the invention of myths or theories in the field of natural 
science has a function—that of helping us to bring order into the events of nature—so has the 
creation of traditions in the field of society"29.  And the reason for changes in traditions is 
that, like scientific theories, they are open to critical appraisal. 
Having explored the nature of tradition, Popper turns to the reasons for its existence.  
Just as people strive to learn about the natural environment, so too do they seek to understand 
society.  The natural propensity for humans to seek uniformity amidst variety (following 
Hutcheson and Smith) leads them to seek uniformities that may exist in society.  From these 
are established traditions, whose unintended consequences are institutions, which are the 
attempts to impose regularity and predictability upon social life.  A distinction that may be 
made is that traditions are static while institutions evolve.  Traditions occupy an intermediate 
position between people and institutions.  At this point, however, Popper parts company with 
the Scots of the Enlightenment when he says:30 
Institutions and traditions have much in common; among other 
things that they must be analysed by the social sciences in terms of 
individual persons, their actions, attitudes, beliefs. expectations, and  
interrelations.  
The Scottish philosophers, including David Hume, did not subscribe to 
methodological individualism, and rejected the rationalism of their English counterparts such 
as Mandeville and Bentham, who were writing in the tradition of Hobbes and Locke 31. 
While connections are sometimes drawn between Popper's positivism and the work of David 
Hume, arguably the greatest of the Scottish philosophers, this in itself represents a 
misunderstanding of Hume. 
Problems arise in Popper's regard for science as an internally-driven phenomenon, 
independent of external factors such as time, location and culture. The treatment of factors as 
internal or external to scientific inquiry is problematic in that there are varying degrees of 
internalisation according to the factors concerned, and that there may exist additional 
variances depending upon the nature of the inquiries. And a simple example of how 
"external" factors interfere with scientific practice involves the nature of the political regime 
to which the scientific community is subject. An extreme instance would be the totalitarian 
regimes which Popper so rightly abhors. Such make it impossible for true scientific inquiry, 
in the way that Popper characterises it, to be conducted, given the constraints placed upon 
freedom of expression and the impact this has on discourse. But the institutional factors 
which drive "normal" science, in the Kuhnian sense, also restrict Popperian inquiry. The 
critical rationalism which Popper sees as true science is always impeded by institutional 
circumstances, regardless of political regime. 
Also, Popper's well known criticism of historicism would appear to contradict his 
recognition of the fundamental importance of tradition, although his depiction of historicism 
as "an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their 
principal aim"32 is almost universally acknowledged as fundamentally wrong33. Unless he 
argues that tradition derives its importance in ways that as temporally bound beings we 
cannot understand, the only means by which we can understand tradition is by the 
retrospective examination of historical events.   
Kuhn's34 notions of paradigms and scientific revolutions addressed the issue of 
external forces in the development of science.  Lakatos'35 concept of scientific research 
programmes was offered as a compromise between Popper's falsificationism and Kuhn.  The 
need that these conceptual constructs appeared to answer was the desire of many for a more 
realistic picture of science than that provided by positivism, already a declining force within 
the philosophy of science.  
Attempts made to apply Popper's methodological prescriptions within economics have 
had mixed fortunes, and there are few who would do so without reservations36, although 
Blaug37 is an unrepentant Popperian.  
The sequential adoption and rejection of first Kuhn's and then Lakatos' frameworks 
resulted from the desire of many for a conceptual system that recognised the reality of what 
we have defined as schools and traditions, and the resulting disappointment over the 
problems of ambiguity posed by each system. Scientists, regardless of discipline, usually 
work in a community and adhere to certain constituent group norms. Popper, Kuhn and 
Lakatos belong to what has been termed the "growth of knowledge tradition" 38 within the 
philosophy of science. This "tradition" grew in response to the difficulties posed by 
positivism. While Popper was closer to the positivists in that he concentrated on single, 
testable statements, Kuhn and Lakatos recognised the importance of institutional elements in 
science.  
However, following the initial enthusiasm which both schemes attracted39, problems 
with ambiguity arose. Basically, the application of these schemes to economics highlighted 
what other historians of science had discovered—there was no definitive history emerging as 
a result of using these analytical tools. Furthermore, each system came under heavy criticism 
from philosophers of science40, with Kuhn being charged with relativism, while Lakatos 
insisted on an internal/external dualism, and the greater importance of internal factors, as 
necessary to the study of the history of science.  There appears to be no consensus either 
within modern philosophy of science or among economic methodologists.  For the moment at 
least, Caldwell's41 vision of methodological pluralism appears to be the reality.   Much of the 
debate in economics has focused on the relative permanence of paradigms or research 
programmes, i.e. whether or not theory has evolved within longstanding traditions. 
In the next section we focus more specifically on an application of the concept of 
tradition to the Scottish Enlightenment period, and indeed on the light that Smith's philosophy 
of science can shed on the concept of tradition. 
 
4.  Tradition in the Scottish Enlightenment 
What we now understand as separate disciplines did not operate in eighteenth century 
social science and Smith's project was one commanding a far greater area than modern 
neoclassical economics could ever properly aspire to42. The Lakatosian apparatus has been 
used to support the idea that somehow there has existed from Adam Smith a continuous hard 
core driving a 200 year old research programme43. But the creation of a separate discipline of 
economics was no part of Smith's agenda.  It can only be credited to him as an unintended 
consequence of his rhetorical flair44, and the appeal that certain elements of his system had 
for English theorists. Hutchison describes Smith not as the founder of political economy, but 
as the source of inspiration for English classical political economy, whose practitioners chose 
to ignore a substantial proportion of the methodological content of the Wealth of Nations 45  
Lakatosian research programmes are, in fact, antithetical to Smith's theory of knowledge, 
which formed a defining element of the Scottish tradition. 
Many commentators are agreed that much of Smith's originality lay in his synthesis of 
existing thought46.  Examination of the works of his contemporaries offers support for this 
assessment, which echoes Smith's own assertion that, in order for science to succeed, content 
is not as important as the style in which it is presented.  Here may lie one reason why Smith's 
work—rather than that of Sir James Steuart, for example—is taken to be the major source of 
inspiration for subsequent writers in political economy.  For Smith, persuasion is the key 
factor determining the quality of philosophical theory.  Good theory satisfies the conflicting 
demands of "realistic"47  representation and simplification. Where a theory is too simplistic, 
or abstracted, then, because of the extent of the difference between theory and reality, it is not 
clear what it is supposed to represent. Where a theory is too realistic, in that it incorporates so 
many variables as to be almost as complex as reality itself, it fails to satisfy the imagination, 
because of the amount of detail that must be processed.  
In articulating his philosophy of science, Smith was in fact assembling ideas from 
various sources, in particular his mentor, Francis Hutcheson. One of the philosophical 
inquiries conducted during the eighteenth century, arising from debates concerning human 
nature, was in aesthetics.  In the closely related field of rhetoric, Smith's expertise is 
acknowledged.  Smith regarded science, whether natural or social, as being the fruit of the 
labours of our imagination—human attempts to connect apparently unrelated phenomena 
with imaginative constructs, preferably based upon a familiar analogy.  For Smith, 
"philosophy is the science of the connecting principles of nature"48, arising out of a human 
desire to settle the tumult of the imagination caused by unexplained phenomena. 
Smith illustrated his philosophy of science by charting the history of astronomy , from 
Aristotle to Newton, via Ptolemy and Copernicus49.  His choice of subject was quite 
deliberate, in that by means of a familiar analogy (everyone has wondered at the stars50) he 
can explain the reasons for the existence, the nature and the conduct of scientific inquiry.  
Thus he is following his own criteria in establishing a philosophy of science, something 
which neither Popper nor Lakatos appeared to do.  In answer to the question 'Why does 
philosophical inquiry take place?', Smith establishes certain principles (the restlessness of the 
mind and the dissatisfaction it brings, prompting investigation), and thereafter applies them to 
a specific example in order to "prove" (or, more accurately, to persuade the reader of) his 
hypothesis.  Smith's use of astronomy illustrated perfectly his argument that simple, familiar 
analogies work best. 
The wonder and surprise occasioned by the observation of the heavens inspired 
philosophers to study the movements of the stars and attempt to understand them. Thus a 
succession of systems was created, explaining those observations available to the 
astronomers. Technological progress reduced the constraints on what the astronomers could 
observe, and so a gradually widening divergence between a model and reality occurred. Initial 
attempts made at incorporating the previously unexplained phenomena resulted in reducing 
the model's simplicity, and thus its beauty, until a stage was reached where the model was 
beginning to resemble reality in terms of its complexity.  At such points a crisis is reached, 
and an alternative theoretical system, based upon a different analogy which served to connect 
the several phenomena, replaces the older theory. In this way Smith could describe the 
progression from the Aristotelian system of concentric spheres, to Ptolemy's eccentric 
spheres, the Copernican revolution and finally to Newton's application of the principle of 
gravity. 
An interesting feature of the scientific "revolutions" outlined by Smith is the tendency 
of some within the scientific community to retain elements of the older system within the 
new.  This is a consequence of human imagination not always being able to adjust easily to 
new patterns of thought.  Thus, for example, the length of time it took for Copernicus' system 
to supersede that of Ptolemy, and the attempt to merge the two, which Smith agrees was 
"happier than that of Ptolemy" but more complex than the system offered by Copernicus.51 
Smith was not operating in a vacuum, and it should be no surprise if his ideas bear 
some resemblance to those of his contemporaries. While the common features of the Scottish 
historical school cannot be examined in detail here, it is worth noting here the similarity 
between Smith's idea of theoretical beauty and the ideas of his mentor, Francis Hutcheson, to 
whose class in moral philosophy Smith belonged during the late 1730s. Hutcheson had 
published in 1725 a defence of the Earl of Shaftesbury's treatment of aesthetics, against the 
opposing views of Bernard Mandeville, who followed in the tradition of Hobbes. Hutcheson 
argued that humans are endowed with a natural sense of beauty, and that this goes beyond 
mere vision, and is in fact what he refers to an "internal sense"52. While we experience 
pleasure in the observation of beautiful physical objects, there is "Beauty perceiv'd in 
Theorems, or universal Truths, in general Causes, and in some extensive Principles of 
Action", and these are "accompany'd with like pleasure"53. Our perception of beauty, for 
Hutcheson, occurs where we observe "uniformity amidst variety"54. This desire for regularity 
begins in infancy, when our aesthetic tastes begin to form55.  
Hutcheson56 specifically deals with the beauty to be found in "theorems": 
 For in one Theorem we may find included, with the most exact 
Agreement, an infinite Multitude of particular Truths; nay, often an 
Infinity of Infinites: so that altho the Necessity of forming abstract 
Ideas, and universal Theorems, arises perhaps from the Limitation of 
our Minds, which cannot admit an infinite Multitude of singular Ideas 
or Judgments at once, yet this Power gives us an Evidence of the 
Largeness of the human Capacity above our Imagination. 
What distinguishes the pleasure derived from this beauty is that it is not the 
consequence of anticipated personal advantage. While Hutcheson does state that "the 
Importance of any Truth is nothing else than its Moment, or Efficacy to make Men happy, or 
to give them the greatest and most lasting Pleasure"57, the pleasure derived therefrom results 
from the beauty observed in the system representing reality, and not what we might 
understand to be commodified utility.  The pleasure we experience upon witnessing beauty is 
a natural endowment. 
Smith explains the developments within astronomy in terms which indicate his belief 
that the sum of knowledge increased with every theory shift. The task of each new theory was 
to explain new facts as well as those which had already been accounted for. However, the 
ability of philosophers to incorporate as many apparently independent phenomena as possible 
into their theoretical systems did not mean that the sum total of scientific knowledge 
increased.  Rather, such outcomes were evidence of the ingenuity of the philosophers 
concerned in building theoretical models of observed events.  Smith's own recourse to history 
in arguing for his model of political economy, for example, together with his view that total 
knowledge increases with every paradigm shift, suggests a position not so distant from that of 
Popper, whom D'Amico58 regards as rejecting a realist philosophy of history.  Smith, like 
Popper, viewed the corpus of scientific theories as a kind of mythology, which nevertheless 
advanced in an evolutionary manner over time. He differed from Popper, however, in that his 
ultimate criterion was persuasion, rather than the ability of theories to withstand rigorous 
testing. 
Smith's unique contribution is the recognition of rhetoric, specifically the role of 
persuasion in the popularity of scientific theories.  Perhaps it is no accident of history that 
today he is still the subject of much invocation and debate among economists, given that one 
of the earliest works of political economy was written by such a master of the rhetorical arts. 
Although not the first to approach the subject, it is a testimony to Smith's rhetorical skills that 
his work has retained a far greater measure of importance than those of his contemporaries.  
His ability to appeal to a wider audience attracted the sarcastic comments of Schumpeter59 
who regarded the Wealth of Nations as never moving "above the heads of even the dullest 
readers". 
Smith persuaded his readers that they did not have to understand why humans acted 
as they did as long as they could appreciate the consequences, intended and unintended, of 
their actions.  The Moral Sentiments was where they should go to understand Smith's social 
psychology.  The Wealth of Nations, which was built on these foundations, was intended for 
a very different audience, and attracted a much greater following60:  
The marked literary superiority of Smith can safely be presumed to have 
gained him readers who wished to have an acquaintance with political economy 
but were not interested in digging deep... There existed a ready market for 
interesting tracts on economics ...In this atmosphere, any work that was well 
written, easy to read, and comprehensive in the branches of political economy 
could reasonably expect an extensive circulation. 
Thus we see Smith as formulating a philosophy of science which incorporated ideas 
from the work of his contemporaries, especially Francis Hutcheson.  For Smith philosophy is 
the science of the connecting principles of nature, where apparently separate phenomena are 
brought together and explained in terms of a few, preferably simple, connecting principles. 
The success of the theoretical system depends upon its ability to persuade. The idea of 
tradition in economics, as in any other social science, is something which connects the works 
of various authors over time. Following Smith, an examination of the development of 
political economy in Scotland can seek to identify those features which are common to a set 
of works, and which can provide a means of connecting the apparently separate outputs of 
different philosophers. 
 
5.  Conclusion  
We have argued that the concept of tradition is a helpful device for the interpretation 
of the history of political economy in Scotland. The importance of tradition in scientific 
inquiry is acknowledged by both Popper and Kuhn61, but neither sought to expand upon it 
beyond speaking of a general "scientific" tradition.  We would claim that within general 
science there exist what might be termed sub-traditions, or traditions belonging to discourse 
communities within the larger scientific world. Popper62 hints at such a possibility. 
We define tradition as those features which, according to the philosophical method 
espoused by Adam Smith, are common to practitioners of science over a relatively long 
period. While this does not preclude differing interpretations of the history of thought, or of 
science generally, it does offer a useful device with which to interpret the past, and comes 
free of the baggage associated with the familiar treatments of science by Popper, Kuhn, and 
Lakatos. It enables historians of economics to take account of factors external to the subject 
(for example, the institutional environment), and it also facilitates the incorporation, or 
otherwise, of schools of thought within the tradition being postulated. 
The task of identifying a separate Scottish political economy tradition must take 
account of the intellectual climate of the nation, and recognise political economy's 
relationship to those other fields of inquiry which, in Scotland, also formed a part of 'moral 
philosophy'.  The concept of tradition enables us to go beyond the ex post imposition of 
disciplinary boundaries and examine the evolution of a form of enquiry whose roots are 
embedded within a particular national culture with its own education and legal systems, and 
economic institutions and circumstances.   Indeed, in using tradition in this way we apply the 
methods which characterise the Scottish approach to philosophical enquiry. 
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